Ganz Bear

Ganz Bear

Love is a GOD given gift

Everything and everyone finds its proper place within this eternal mystery. At the same time, the Incarnate Word has disclosed that the mystery of love that constitutes us (Jn 1:3; Col 1:15–20) is pure gift of himself. Divine love is an ever-new gift of himself to himself (Hingabe) and an undeserved gift of himself to us (Eph 2:4; Rom 8:32). God is an event of love. 1John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no. 10. 2Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama. Theological Dramatic Theory (=TD), vol. 5: The Last Act, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983), 67. 3The centrality of this concept in Balthasar's thought is indicated by, among others, Gerard F. O'Hanlon, S.J., The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs To better perceive the richness of Balthasar's proposal, this article has been divided into five parts. After an introductory philosophical analysis of the term "event," which indicates the main characteristics of this complex term, attention shifts to the person of Christ in order to delineate what he reveals of the "eventful nature" of God.4 The third part of the paper attempts to elucidate a notion of person that is fitting for the portrayal of the divine love Christ revealed as an agapic threefold donation. This understanding of the divine hypostases will then enable us in the fourth part to approach the richness indicated by the mysterious unity of esse and event. This section shows in what sense the divine being is "ever-greater." The final section offers some remarks on the implications for human existence that emerge from this understanding of God as eventA preliminary approximation In our common parlance, the term "event" stands for "the possible or factual happening of anything."5 The association of von Balthasar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Karl J. Wallner, "Ein trinitarisches Strukturprinzip in der Trilogie Hans Urs von Balthasars?" Theologie und Philosophie 71 (1996): 532–546; Guy Mansini, "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the Trinity," The Thomist 64 (2000): 499–519; Stephen Fields, S.J., "The Singular as Event: Postmodernism, Rahner, and Balthasar," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2003): 93–111; Angelo Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar. A Theological Style (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 53–64. 4On the importance of the category of event see, among others, Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); id., "Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?'" in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 231–238. Jean-Luc Marion offers an interesting analysis of the meaning of "event," which, in contrast to the one presented here, is geared towards illustrating how the given phenomenon, and givenness as such, needs to be considered apart from any logic of causality. See Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given. Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002); Luigi Giussani, He is if he changes, Supplement no. 7/8 to 30 Days (Rome), 1994; Luigi Giussani, Stefano Alberto, and Javier Prades, Generare tracce nella storia del mondo (Milan: Rizzoli, 1998); Joseph Ratzinger, The God of Jesus Christ. Meditations on God in the Trinity, trans. Robert J. Cunningham (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1979). 5Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "event."event" with "happening" indicates that an event is the presentation of a phenomenon to someone as a living "pro-vocation," which, without predetermining his answer, requires man to acknowledge it, that is to say, not simply to take notice of it, but rather to welcome it. In comparison to what took place before it, the event is unforeseeable and unpredictable; its unexpected occurrence does not seem to respect the chain of cause and effects that was previously in place. In this regard, although the event is never completely alien to what came before it, its appearance can seem remarkably close to chance.6 The ostensible indeterminacy of its origins undergirds the event's incomprehensibility. Although no one can ever give a full account of the entire event, this incomprehensibility does not leave an interlocutor facing an absolute void of meaning. On the contrary, the incomprehensibility itself places its addressee in relation to the whole because through its form, the event introduces him into a deeper, richer dimension of the landscape of being. This is why the "ungraspability" of the event should not be perceived as an objection to or jettisoning of reason, but rather as the possibility for reason to discover truth. It is its connection to the whole that enables the event, by its sheer appearing, to reshape and enrich the present and to sharpen human expectations. Once it has come to pass, the event cannot be either undone or called back. What the event bears in itself makes wonder and gratitude its most fitting reception.7 Although some events have a greater subjective and objective significance, all events, even those that have fallen under the shadow of what is (always regrettably) written off as "obvious," have this eventful character. In fact, the most important events in life—like encountering the beloved, the birth of a child, or being granted an undeserved forgiveness—always refresh one's own gaze and allow human memory to rediscover the depth of every being 6Severinus Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, V, 1. 7To ascribe this importance to "wonder" distances our reflection from the negative Heideggerian question, "why are there essents rather than nothingness?" (Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975], 1). Wonder originates within the surprise that the other is, and not that that which is could not be. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b, 11–19. To answer Heidegger's question Balthasar writes that "only a philosophy of freedom and love can account for our existence, though not unless it also interprets the essence of finite being in terms of love" (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible (=LA), trans. D. C. Schindler [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004], 143)(one's very self included) and its surprising and permanent comingto- be, coming-to-itself.8 As Guardini states, "in the experience of great love . . . all of what takes place becomes an event within it."9 The Latin root of the term, ex-venio, reminds us that event means "that which comes out from." Unless one wishes to maintain the Heraclitean reduction of what appears to sheer phenomenality, it is necessary to recognize that in every e-vent there is a distinction between an appearance and a "whence"—what Balthasar calls "form" (Gestalt). The event brings into the present both its contingent manifestation and, in it, its grounding depth. This depth, however, should not be identified with another particular being, but rather with the transcendent ground (being itself) that freely discloses itself without losing itself in the process. To say that beings do not "come from" themselves requires the recognition of a mysterious and real distinction between the essence and existence of every being, "between the unity of all existing beings that share in being and the unity of each individual being in the uniqueness and incommunicability of its particular being," and, ultimately, between beings and a transcendent being, which philosophy calls the absolute, and theology, God.10 It is this final distinction that both prevents us from 8Although for obvious reasons we cannot delve into this matter, we need to indicate that memory is neither a simple "looking back" nor an attempt to bring into the present that which has already come to pass. Without denying the understanding of memory as "recollection," we would like to highlight a eucharistic conception of memory as the retrieval of interiority. Memory is then the capacity of the human gaze to rest on the dual movement of being and appearance, which, beginning with the form, is led on to the ground of the form, a ground that is older than the one who remembers. It is in this sense that "recollection" is included in memory. 9Romano Guardini, Das Wesen des Christentums (Würzburg: Werkbund Verlag, 1949), 12: "In der Erfahrung der grossen Liebe sammelt sich die ganze Welt in das Ich-Du, und alles Geschehende wird zu einem Begebnis innerhalb dieses Bezuges." 10TD 5, 67–68. Cf. Aquinas, De Ver. q. 27, a. 1, ad 8, for his understanding of "compositio realis." For Balthasar the ontological difference can be unfolded into four parts: the first between the I and the Thou; the second between being and that which exists; the third between essence and existence; the last one, a "theological difference," between beings and being itself, which freely and gratuitously puts everything into existence. Cf. Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 5: The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern Age, trans. Oliver Davies et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 429–450. See also Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002); John D. Caputoconceiving the transcendent ground as another being among beings—thus collapsing metaphysics into onto-theology—and allows us to discover the coextensiveness of being and freedom without, on the one hand, welding being to history, or, on the other, abandoning beings to a capricious, undetermined, absolute freedom.11 Beings, then, can be considered events inasmuch as they appear proceeding from being itself, the ever-greater ground that does not have a "beyond itself." If the "coming-from" of the event brings to light a distinction between the phenomenon and its origin, it also indicates that being is an event of inexhaustible disclosure. The self-manifestation of being is always richer, not only in the sense that there is always something new (this would reduce the infinity of the ground to a quantifiable dimension and reduce being to beings), but, more deeply, in the sense that it is a gratuitous, absolutely free manifestation. 12 If this self-presentation were simply mechanical or haphazard "Heidegger's ‘Dif-ference' and the Distinction Between Esse and Ens in St. Thomas," International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1980): 161–181. 11To think of the theological difference in these terms implies rooting the ontological difference in a theological difference, i.e., a difference in God. In order to preserve the difference between God and beings, however, the difference in God needs to be thought in terms of positivity and not, as is the case of Hegel, in terms of negativity. This positive differentiation is not adequately conceived unless it is posed in personal terms, i.e., to talk about difference in the absolute requires talking about personal difference.

About the Author

drizharnium@gmail.com, Bangalore India

webkinz survey?

1 how many webkinz do u have?
2 what kind r they
3what r their names
4 what do u think the cutest vitural webkinz pet is?
5 what was ur first webkinz?
6 who is ur favorite webkinz character?
7 what webkinz should ganz make next?
8 how many rooms do u have?
9 what is ur favorite outfit for your webkinz?
10 what's ur favorite theme?
11how many boys and girls do u have?
12what is ur username?
13 did u or r u going to the webkinz extravaganza day?
14 what do u think it the softest pet?

I will answer the survey too hehe

1 11
2.Panda, cheeky monkey, chocolate lab, black cat, reindeer, german shepherd, lilkinz penguin, polar bear, cow, tie dye frog, velvety elepahant.
3 reily nick sarah oreo comet zeus joey lilly daisy katie emily
4 chocolate la
5 panda
6 amanda panda
7 sea cretures
8 44
9 i like them all
10 beach
11 g-7 b-4
12 Brooke528
13 yes
14 velvety elephant

i dont know how old ur but webkinz r supposed to be 4 like 9-yr olds at the oldest

The Aikiu - The Red Kiss (Palmbomen Remake)